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APPELLANT BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH CITATION TO THE RECORD
Pursuant to a plea agreement between Appellant Damon Comer and the State of Utah,
Appellant Comer specifically reserved his right to appeal the suppression issue. In the Judgment and
Order on Plea Held in Abeyance dated March 30, 2001 by the Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield
paragraph 17 specifically states Appellant guilty plea was conditional, reserving the right to appeal.
R. 118. (Attachment 1)
In the minutes of the hearing held on March 27, 2001, the specifically states "Defendant
reserves the right to appeal on the search issue." R110. (Attachment 2)

ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I:

Appellant Damon Comer Specifically Reserved his Right to Appeal in the
Plea in Abeyance.

Pursuant to a plea agreement between Appellant Damon Comer and the State of Utah,
Appellant Comer specifically reserved his right to appeal the suppression issue. In the Judgment and
Order on Plea Held in Abeyance dated March 30, 2001 by the Honorable Judge Ben H. Hadfield
paragraph 17 specifically states Appellant guilty plea was conditional, reserving the right to appeal.
R. 118. (Attachment 1)
Further, in the minutes of the hearing held on March 27, 2001, the agreement specifically
states 'Defendant reserves the right to appeal on the search issue." R 110. (Attachment 2)
In State v. Sery. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1998) this Court held
We hold that conditional pleas of the sort in issue here, when agreed to by the
1

defendant and the prosecution and approved by the trial court, are permissible in Utah
even though they are not specifically authorized by the statutes governing the entry
of pleas by criminal defendants. > (FN4) See > Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-1 (1988);
> Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-13-2, -3, -6 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-11 (1988).
Conditional plea agreements were accepted by the state courts in Oveson, Ashby,
Crosby, and Reid, cited above, despite the absence in those jurisdictions of any
authorizing court rule or statute. They were also accepted by two federal circuits
long before the 1983 adoption of > Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), which for thefirsttime
affirmatively authorized conditional pleas of guilty or nolo contendere that preserved
a federal defendant's right to appellate review of adverse pre-trial rulings, including
those on fourth amendment issues. > See United States v. Moskow, 588 F.2d 882
(3d Cir.1978); > United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.1975) (pre-trial
motion to suppress). > (FN5) More recently, the defendant in > United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983), had pleaded
guilty but expressly reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.
The United States Supreme Court tacitly approved of that conditional plea practice,
notwithstanding the lack of any authorizing statute or rule, by addressing the merits
of the fourth amendment issue and affirming the Second Circuit's reversal of the trial
court's denial of defendant Place's motion to suppress.

758 P.2d 935, State v. Sery, (Utah App. 1988)
„
Excerpt from pages 758 P.2d 939-758 P.2d 940
In the present action, Appellant specifically reserved his right to appeal through the plea in
abeyance. It was part of the agreement and part of the contractual bargain entered into by Appellant.
Further, the Trial Court fully approved and signed the order allowing the plea in abeyance
with the preservation of the appeal.
ISSUE II

Appellants should have been allowed to use the Preliminary Hearing
Tape at the Suppression Hearing

Officer Dickey testified he briefly scanned the room when he entered the residence. Counsel
requested to show the video tape of the preliminary hearing as it evidenced Officer Dickey's
testimony was inconsistent with earlier testimony. R. 126 P 9.
At the Suppression hearing, Officer Dickey testified as follows:
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Tell me what you mean when you briefly scan the room? Do you look
everywhere at everything in the room?
No.
You look all around the room? What do you briefly scan for?
I briefly scan to see if there's a shotgun laying on the table.
I see. So, based on this scan you just testified you did, you would
have noticed a shotgun on the table or a person sitting in a chair with
a gun. Did you notice if there was any furniture knocked over?
Would you have noticed if there was any holes in the walls?
Yes, sir.
All right. Now, I'm going to ask you whether or not you remember
testifying at the preliminary hearing in this matter?
Briefly.
Well, do you remember if you testimony would be the same as it was
today, if you're telling the truth.
Yes, it would be. R 126 P. 10

During the preliminary hearing, Officer Dickey testified as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

When you got inside the home there was nothing inside the home to
indicate that there'd been any violence inside the home, correct?
My focus was on Ms. Comer. I didn't have time to can the living area
of the home.
If there'd been something out of place, a broken table, a hole in the
wall, something like that, that would have caught your attention and
raised your level of officer safety, correct?
My concern was with Ms. Comer at that time. She's my initial threat?
R 127 P. 13

After the above testimony, and at the end of the hearing, Counsel for Appellant stated that
Appellants wished to show the video tape of the preliminary hearing to verify Officer Dickey had
made an inconsistent statement from the prior testimony at the preliminary hearing. The Court
declined to hear this evidence and stated that was not the critical issue. R 126 P. 31-32.
Although not a major point in the present appeal, Appellants argue the Court did not afford
a fair hearing on the motion to suppress by not allowing Appellants to use the video tape of the
preliminary hearing to cross-examine the witness. Appellants attempted to show the Officer Dickey's
3

testimony was inconsistent from his testimony at the preliminary hearing.
The purpose of exploring the inconsistent statements of Officer Dickey and Detective Vincent
was to show the officers were attempting to posture their case as the issues become apparent.
For instance, there was a big issue about what took place at the door of the residence,
specifically whether Ms. Comer came outside and closed the door or whether she peeked out from
inside. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Dickey testified Ms. Comer immediately shut the door
behind her. R. 127 P. 11. At the suppression hearing, Officer Dickey testified Ms. Comer opened
the door and peeked around. R 126 P. 7. Officer Vincent testified Ms. Comer pulled the door pretty
much closed. R. 127 P. 27.
Further, there was an issue about whether Officer Dickey scanned the room for weapons or
did not scan the room. As noted in the facts above, Officer Dickey stated at the preliminary hearing
he did not scan the room because his focus was on Ms. Comer. As the suppression hearing, when
the issue of whether the officers had probable cause to enter the home, Officer Dickey suddenly
becomes more concerned about his safety and how much of a threat there really was. There is
sufficient evidence to show Officer Dickey is attempting to add facts and change his story to posture
the case.
Also, the Court found that Ms. Comer's 'unexplained' re-entry into the home gave the
officers probable cause to believe an emergency existed. However, this testimony is in contradiction
between the two hearings.
First, at the preliminary hearing, Officer Dickey testified as follows:
Q.
A.

When you got there you knocked on the front door and Mrs. Comer
answered the door, is that right?
Yes, she did.
4

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

And then what happened?
At that point I asked Ms. Comer if anyone else was in the house. I
conversed with her briefly as to why I was there. At that time she
stated that her husband was also in the house.
And did she go back into the house to get him.
Yes, she did. R 127 P. 4

At the suppression hearing, Officer Dickey testified as follows:
Q.

A.

And then as you question her about the -- you told her why you were
there. As you question her about other people in the home, as I
understand your testimony you didn't say can we talk to your husband.
She just turned around and headed back into the house?
Correct. R. 126 P. 7

Finally, at the preliminary hearing Detective Vincent testified as follows:
A.

Officer Dickey knocked on the door. Ms. Comer came to the door.
Again, when she came out, she came outside the door and then just
kind of pulled the door closed. We visited at that point. I don't recall
a lot of what was said. I recall Officer Dickey asking if there was
anybody else in the home. She stated that her husband was there. I
believe that he indicated that we would need to talk to him as well.
R. 127 P. 27

Officer Dickey's testimony at the suppression hearing about Ms. Comer's reaction at the
door, and what questions were asked to her, is in direct contradiction to his own testimony at the
preliminary hearing as well as Detective Vincent's testimony.
Again, Appellants sought to explore the inconsistent testimony to further support the
argument the officers were posturing the case as the issues became apparent. This is incredibly
important based on the fact the Trial Court found an emergency existed because of Ms. Comer's
unexplained retreat into the home. R. 126 P. 40
Further, credibility is always an issue during testimony of witnesses. In essence, the only
evidence the trial court has is the testimony of witnesses. If there is evidence a witness is testifying
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inconsistently, it may call into question the witnesses' entire testimony. The trial court should have
allowed Appellants to present evidence to challenge the veracity of the witnesses statements.
ISSUE HI:

Exigent Circumstances did not Exist Justifying the Officers'
Warrantless Entry into the Home

The emergency aid doctrine requires three criteria to be met prior to finding a justified
warrantless entry into a home.
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency
exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of
life.
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize
evidence.
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area
or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to be
searched and the emergency.
Salt Lake Citv v. Davidson. 994 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Utah App. 2000).
Contrary to Appellee's brief, the State of Utah has been unable to prove the first prong of the
emergency circumstances exception.
Thefirstprong requires the officers to have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an
emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life.
The first officer to testify at the suppression hearing was officer Dickey. There were basically
three instances when officer Dickey testified regarding the first prong of the emergency circumstances
doctrine.
Officer Dickey first stated
Q.
A.

When Ms. Comer comes to the door and doesn't open it completely, does that indicate
anything to you?
Umm, it appeared to me, being - obviously she knows who we are. Police officers
in full uniform. It appeared odd to me that she would just open the door to peek
around and speak with us. I appeared to me that she may have been trying to — I
don't know, either conceal something of just prevent us from seeing inside the
6

residence. R. 126 p.7
Officer Dickey stated second
Q.

Did that raise any concerns of yours?

A.

If just appeared odd that, you know, I didn't request for her to go get her husband.
She just automatically turned to go get him of to get away from speaking with me.
R. 126 p. 8

Officer Dickey stated finally
Q.
A.

So let me ask you, at that time did you believe that there was an emergency that you
needed to immediately respond to?
I didn't know one way or the other. Just the report that I had was all the information
I had. R 126 p. 20

Next, Officer Vincent testified about thefirstprong of the emergency circumstances doctrine.
Officer Vincent first testified.
A.

There was some conversation as to what had gone on as far as a family fight situation.
She was asked if there was anyone else in the house. Ms. Comer indicated that her
husband was in there. And then she went back in the house to get him. R. 126 p. 22

Second, Officer Vincent testified as follows
Q.

A.

All right. Can you point to anything — when you arrived at that residence can you
point to anything that would have led to you believe that an emergency situation
existed?
No. Just the fact that we received the call indicating that there was some kind of
altercation there. R. 126 p. 24

Third, Officer Vincent testified as follows:
Q.

A.

All right. Was there ever a time during the entire thing, from the time dispatch called
to the time youfinishedthis investigation, that there was ever an emergency situation
requiring immediate assistance for the protection of anybody's life.
Probably not that was life threatening. You know, obviously, in a family fight I think
things can escalate to that, but that's hard for me to say. I don't know what may have
happened had we not gotten there. That I don't know. R 126 p, 26
7

In Appellee's brief, Appellee cites State v. Lynd P.2d 770, 773 (Wash. App. 1989) where the
Washington Appellate Court stated
Whether a police officer acts in the face of a perceived emergency were
objectively reasonable is a matter to be evaluated in relation to the scene as it
reasonably appeared to the officer at the time, not as it may seem to a scholar after
the event with the benefit of leisured retrospective analysis.
In the present action, through all the testimony of both oSlcers as stated above, there was not
one indication of what the objective reasonable basis supporting the suspicion of the emergency was.
The nearest either officer got to an objective reasonable belief there was an emergency was in the
testimony that sometimes family fights involve injured victims, sometimes, not all the time. Both
officers merely pointed to generalities about domestic violence calls.
The Appellee is right on point in stating the determination of an objective reasonable belief
should be evaluatedfromthe officers in the situation and not by scholars months after. In the present
action, the Appellee, as the trial court did, is doing just that.
Appellee's brief is filled with generalities about domestic violence and the nature of those
types of calls. What is missing in these facts regarding thefirstprong of the emergency circumstances
doctrine is the objective reasonable basis, from testimony by the officers in this action, that an
emergency existed and there needed to be immediate action for the protection of life.
Finally, there is ample evidence Officer Dickey changed his story several times in order to give
more credibility to the perceived emergency after the memorandums had beenfiledand the issues
were apparent. In section two of this brief, regarding the preliminary hearing transcript, there are
several instances of inconsistent testimony. One of the most important is the testimony regarding
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Appellant Misty Comer's re-entry into the home. The Trial Court found this to be a significant fact
when the Court ruled
In this case the court finds that the requirements have been met for the
following reason. The defendant, Misty Comer, according to the testimony, made a
somewhat sudden and unexplained retreat into the house. In other words, without
saying why. And during the middle of a conversation
with the officers she heads back into the house. R. 126 P. 40.
Based upon an examination of the two hearings, it is clear Ms. Comer was asked to go back
inside and get her husband, and there was nothing unusual or unexplained about this re-entry. Officer
Dickey states as such at the preliminary hearing. R. 127 P. 4. Further, Officer Vincent verifies the
fact Ms. Comer was asked to go back inside to get her husband. R. 127 P. 27
After reviewing the testimony from both of the hearings in this matter, it is clear the only way
the Trial Court could find there was a reasonable belief an emergency existed was to conclude that
there is a reasonable belief of an emergency every time there is a report of a family fight. Report of
a family fight is simply not sufficient basis to enter a person's home without a warrant.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above arguments, the trial court erred in denying Appellants' motion to
suppress. Emergency circumstances did not exist which would allow a warrantless entry into
Appellants' residence.
Respectfully submitted this [^\

day of October, 2001.
BOND
Attoniey for Appellknt

Request for Oral Argument
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I hereby certify I mailed a two true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief to the following:
Jeffery S. Gray
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P.O. Box 140854
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DATED this / / day of October, 2001.
STIN C. BOND
Attorney at Law
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ATTACHMENT 1
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
'

C" " '

'

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

j:

vs.

>

DAMON COMER,

:

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
V
ON PLEA HELD IN ABEYANCE ^
<cr>

Case No. 001100432

Defendant.
Defendant appeared in open court, with his attorney, Justin
C. Bond, on the 27th day of March 2001, with the State being
represented by Jon J. Bunderson, and the defendant having
previously entered into a Plea in Abeyance Agreement which was
accepted and approved by the Court, and the parties having
previously moved for the Court to accept defendant's Plea in
Abeyance, which Motion the Court granted, and the defendant
having entered his plea of guilty,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The defendant has entered a plea of guilty to the crime

or crimes of:

POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A 2ND DEGREE

FELONY
2.

The Court has accepted defendant's plea, and has found

the same to be given voluntarily and knowingly, and the plea
shall be held in abeyance pursuant to the terms and conditions of
this Order.

3.

The defendant is hereby placed under the supervision of

the Adult Probation and Parole Office, Utah Department of
Corrections, and is ordered to comply with the terms and
conditions hereof as if the defendant were on probation.
4.

The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the

Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and comply
strictly with its terms and conditions, including any search and
seizure waivers contained therein.
5.

The defendant shall report to the Department and to the

Court whenever required.
6.

The defendant shall violate no law, either Federal,

State, or Municipal.
7.

Upon successful completion of the terms and conditions

of the Plea in Abeyance and this Order, the charge shall be
reduced to a conviction of ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF
METHAMPHETAMINE, A CLASS MA,f MISDEMEANOR.
8.

Restitution is ordered as follows:

9.

Defendant shall pay an administrative fee of $200.

10.

NONE ORDERED

Defendant shall serve two weekends in the Box Elder

County Jail, starting March 30, 2001.
11.

Defendant shall obtain an identification card in a form

prescribed by Adult Probation and Parole and carry it at all
times, and display the same to any law enforcement officer with
whom the defendant comes into contact in the officer's official
capacity.
2

12.

Defendant shall display an anti-drug bumper sticker on

any vehicle defendant drives; if ordered by Adult Probation and
Parole, defendant shall also display an anti-drug bumper sticker
at defendant's home in the location ordered by Adult Probation
and Parole.
13.

Defendant shall not consume or possess alcohol or

illegal drugs, or associate with anyone who uses illegal drugs or
is consuming alcohol, nor shall defendant be present in any place
where alcohol is the main item served on the menu or where
controlled substances are being used.
14.

Defendant shall obtain any evaluation required by Adult

Probation and Parole or the Court, and defendant shall enter
into, successfully complete, and pay for any counseling or
program ordered by Adult Probation and Parole, through a provider
approved by Adult Probation and Parole, and successfully complete
all required aftercare.
15.

Defendant's person, property, breath, and bodily fluids

shall be subject to random search and seizure during the term of
his probation by all law enforcement personnel, to determine his
compliance with terms of probation.
16.

Defendant shall pay Box Elder County the sum of $250 as

compensation for the public defender.
17.

Defendant's guilty plea was conditional, reserving the

right to appeal.

3

The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and
further Orders as it may deem necessary from time to time, and,
further, retains jurisdiction to terminate the terms and
conditions hereof and enter defendant's plea of guilty.

The

Court further retains jurisdiction to sentence the defendant,
either at such time as this Order is terminated, or at such time
as the defendant successfully completes the terms and conditions
hereof.
DATED this

^°

rlorcL

day of

2001.

DISTRICT JUDGE
ATTEST:
JOE DERRING, COURT CLERK

)eputy Clerk

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER ON PLEA HELD IN ABEYANCE to
defendant's attorney, Justin C. Bond, P. O. Box 895, Brigham
City, Utah 84302, postage prepaid, this

mr\M-,W

2001,

^ M

\L&
Secretary
A.

day of

•\ \ , V

KkXO-rM-i

ATTACHMENT 2

11

FIRST DISTRICT - Box Elder COURT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
PLEA IN ABEYANCE
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001100432 FS

DAMON REX COMER,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

BEN HADFIELD
March 27, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
shaunaw
Prosecutor: BUNDERSON, JON J.
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): BOND, JUSTIN C
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: December 16, 1975
Video
Tape Count: 9:02 AM
CHARGES
1. POSS/DIST C/S W/IN 1000' OF SCHL/PBLIC P - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/06/2001 Plea in abeyance
PLEA IN ABEYANCE
Defendant's plea is held in abeyance.
DIVERSION ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS
PAY A PLEA IN ABEYANCE FEE OF $200
SERVE 2 WEEKENDS IN JAIL FROM 6 PM FRIDAY TO 6 PM SUNDAY
OBTAIN AND CARRY A PROBATION I.D. CARD
DISPLAY AN ANTI-DRUG BUMPER STICKER ON ON VEHICLE OR IN FRONT
WINDOW OF RESIDENCE
DO NOT POSSESS OR CONSUME ALCOHOL OR ILLEGAL DRUGS OR FREQUENT ANY
PLACES WHERE ALCHOL IS THE CHIEF ITEM OF SALE
Page 1

Case No: 001100432
Date:
Mar 27, 2001
SUBMIT TO RANDOM SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND CHEMICAL TESTING
SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE A SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PROGRAM AND
AFTERCARE AND PAY THE COSTS
PAY A PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE IN THE AMOUNT OF $250.
POSSESS NO WEAPONS DURING PERIOD OF SUPERVISION

In addition to the fine, the defendant is ordered to pay 200.00 for
PLEA IN ABEY FELONY.
Pay fine to The Court.
DEF RESERVES THE RIGHT TO APPEAL ON THE SEARCH ISSUE.
Dated this

day of

, 20

.

BEN HADFIELD
District Court Judge

